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ATTORNEYS-CONTEun -LIAnILTY FOR STATEmENTS MULDE ON BEHALF'
OF CL;mT.-The defendant, an attorney, had filed on behalf of his client
a certified petition for a writ of review, alleging that the plea of guilty
had been forced upon his client by the threats of the then United States
attorney. The latter, who had in the interim become district judge, and
to whom the application was made, refused to issue the writ and summarily
fined the defendant for contempt of court in knowingly making false al-
legations. The attorney later filed an affidavit of prejudice and was again
fined by the same judge for contempt. On appeal from the sentence, the
circuit court reversed the judgment of the district court as violating the
"due process" clause of the Federal Constitution, and was of the opinion
that an attorney could not be summarily punished for contempt merely
because a statement made on behalf of a client was subsequently discovered
to be untrue. Paul v. United States, 36 F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929).
An attorney occupies a dual position, owing duties to his client, n
counsel, and to the court, as an officer of the court. Cf. In re Bcrgcron,
220 Mass. 472, 107 N. E. 1007 (1915). His primary obligation, in theory at
least, is to the due administration of justice, although some leeway has
been allowed an attorney over-zealous in the interests of his client. In
re Thomas, 36 Fed. 242 (C. C. Colo. 1888) ; In 70 Barnes, 16 Pae. 896 (Cal.
1888). When an attorney has knowingly induced or assented to the per-
petration of a fraud upon the court, a proceeding for disbarment or disci-
plinary action would seem to be the proper course to pursue. See Brody,
The Duty of the Lawyer to the Court (1926) 11 IowA L. Rzv. 224. Thus
permitting false testimony on the part of a client or witness has been held'
sufficient ground for such action. People v. Beattie, 137 Ill. 553, 27 N. E.
1096 (1891); In 'e Schapiro, 144 App. Div. 1, 128 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1st
Dep't 1911); In re Mendelsohn, 150 App. Div. 445, 135 N. Y. Supp. 438
(Ist Dep't 1912). An attorney may similarly be held to account for allow-
ing his client to verify a pleading containing a false material allegation.
In re Mathot, 178 App. Div. 759, 166 N. Y. Supp. 217 (1st Dep'b 1917);
In re Tinney, 187 App. Div. 569, 176 N. Y. Supp. 102 (1st Dep't 1919). He
has in like manner been held responsible for use of false affidavits. In ro
Schleimer, 150 App. Div. 507, 135 N. Y. Supp. 406 (1st Dep't 1912) ; In ro
People v. Martin, 288 Ill. 615, 124 N. E. 340 (1919). And the offense thus
punishable need not be ;in active one, but may consist merely in concealing
a material matter within his knowledge. In 7e Mohcr, 24 Oda. 61, 102
Pac. 705 (1909); People v. Ca-e, 241 Ill. 279, 89 N. E. 638 (1909); In re
Marron, 22 N. M. 252, 160 Pac. 391 (1916). With respect to the alterna-
tive remedy of contempt proceedings for punishing a fraud upon a court
by an attorney, it is frequently asserted as a general rule that statements
of fact made in good faith on behalf of a client, and under the belief that
they are true, will not support such action. See Huggins v. Field, 196
Ky. 501, 505, 244 S. W. 903, 905 (1922). Yet insufficient investigation of
their truth may negative good faith. State v. Martin, 125 Okla. 51, 256
Pac. 667 (1927). And some courts have held that statements of opinion
expressed as belief do not come within the license accorded to statements
of fact. Lamberson v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 458, 91 Pac. 100 (1907);
Huggins v. Field, supra. The effect of such decisions, in view of the tenu-
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ous nature of any distinction between "statements of fact" and "statements
of opinion expressed as belief" would seem to be to grant the trial judge
the power of arbitrary punishment in the situation presented by the prin-
cipal case. But in all cases involving a fraud upon the court, the intent
of the attorney is an essential element of the offense. Sparks v. Com-
monwealth, 224 Ky. 221, 8 S. W. (2d) 397 (1928). This being so, he is
entitled to an adequate hearing, and it would seem undesirable, as indi-
cated by the instant decision, to allow the court to punish summarily for
contempt merely because an allegation of fact later proves to be untrue.
AUTOMOBILES-TORTS-APPLICATION OF "FAMILY CAR" DOCTISNE TO
NoN-OwNER.-An automobile, owned by the defendant's employer, was
furnished the defendant to be used solely for business purposes. The de-
fendant's minor son, who had twice before been sent on errands in the
car, injured the plaintiff while driving the car for purposes of his own with-
out the defendant's knowledge. In a joint action for damages, the lower
court dismissed the suit against the employer and denied recovery against
the father, although sustaining a finding that the car had been used 'with
the father's implied consent. On appeal, the judgment was reversed as to
the father on the ground that the "family purpose" doctrine applied, inas-
much as the car had previously been used for family purposes. Mann v.
Cook, 23 S. W. (2d) 860 (Tex. 1929).
The "family purpose" doctrine was evolved to ensure compensation for
a person injured by a, vehicle driven by some member of the owner's
family likely to be financially irresponsible. See Hutchins v. Haffncr, 63
Colo. 365, 369, 167 Pac. 966, 968 (1917); Note (1919) 5 A. L. R. 227. In
thus allowing recovery against one not directly at fault some courts have
sought legal justification for their decisions by expressly basing them on
an "agency" created by varying facts. Cf. Lashbrook v. Patten, 62 Ky.
316 (1865) (son acting as father's servant); Birch v. Abercrombie, 74
Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020 (1913) (daughter using car for purpose for
which defendant bought it); Missell v. Hayes, 86 N. J. L. 348, 91 Atl.
322 (1914) (other members of family present in car); Baldwin v. Parsons,
193 Iowa 75, 186 N. W. 665 (1922) (owner consented to son's use of car
on particular occasion). Even while granting the desirability of the result
thus obtained, such reasoning has been severely criticized as stretching the
theory of agency to an untenable extent. See Van Blaricom v. Dodgson,
220 N. Y. 111, 115, 115 N. E. 443, 444 (1917); Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan.
629, 631, 176 Pac. 131 (1918); Arkin v. Page, 287 I1. 420, 426, 123 N. E.
30, 32 (1919); Hope, The Doctrine of the Family Automobile (1922) 8 A.
B. A. J. 359. And later leading cases, while not discarding this reasoning
entirely, seem to base the owner's liability on the more rational idea that
the owner, having provided an automobile for his family, should be held
entirely responsible for it. See King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S. W.
296 (1918); G'raharm v. Page, 300 Ill. 40, 132 N. E. 817 (1921) (over-
ruling Arkin v. Page, supra). In general, the courts have not hesitated
to base liability on direct control exercised from within the automobile by
one who is neither the owner nor the driver. Williams v. Blue, 173 N. C.
452, 92 S. E. 270 (1917) (defendant directing son's operation of friend's
car); Gates v. Pendleton, 184 Cal. 797, 195 Pac. 664 (1921) (defendant
using son's car with chauffeur); BEaRY, AUTOMOBILES (6th ed. 1929) § 1445.
The instant case, through the medium of the "family car" doctrine, ex-
tends the coatrol factor as a sole basis of liability to a more remote type
of control. The same principle has elsewhere been implied in a statute
specifying control as alternative to title in defining automobile ownership
with reference to accident liability. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1923) 5128
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§ 16. Cf. Cittenden v. Murphy, 36 Cal. App. 803, 173 Pac. 595 (1918);
IOWA CODE (1927) c. 251, § 4960. See Heyting, Automobiles and Vicari-
ous Liability (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 225. Moreover, since the owner-em-
ployer would seem the more competent person to shift or distribute the
risk, the holding in the instant case illustrates that the prevention factor
latent in the element of control is often likely to make the stronger appeal
in judicial application of the "family car" doctrine. Cf. Douglas, Vicarous
Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 584, 595, 601,
et seq.
BIS AND NoTEs-E 'zEacE ON FACE oF NOTE TO ExEcuTonY AGna=-
SNT As DEFEATING N 0TIr=nrrY.-An instrument transferred for value
to the plaintiff bank contained the following writing: "This note is given
for the payment of Five units of the Cosmopolitan Five Cents to One Dol-
lar Stores Inc., stock: said units of stock are not to be issued until this
note is paid in full: and then the said unit shares of stock are to be issued
and delivered as set forth in a subscription contract of even date and signed
by the maker hereof." After negotiation the payee became inzolyent and
the-shares were thus not deliverable at the time this suit was brought to
collect the note. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff. On
appeal the judgment was reversed, the court holding that the note was non-
negotiable because it ". . . . imparted notice to the bank that . . .
there would be a total failure of consideration unles certifieates were
issued and delivered for the stock at the time the note was paid," and the
promise to pay was thus made conditional. First National Banl; in Salem
v. Morgan, 284 Pac. 582 (Ore. 1930).
The fact that an instrument carries a statement of an executory agree-
ment does not ordinarily render it non-negotiable in form if it is otherwise
unobjectionable. Coffin v. May, 104 N. J. L. 347, 140 AtI. 331 (1928); Na-
tional Bank of Watervliet v. Martin, 203 App. Div. 390, 196 N. Y. Supp.
714 (3d Dep't 1922). But some courts impl.y from such statement a con-
dition defeating negotiability. International Finance Corp. v. Calvcrt Drug
Co, 144 Md. 303, 124 AtL 891 (1924); Continental Bank & Trz "- Co. v.
Times Pub. Co., 142 La. 209, 76 So. 612 (1917) ; Ivory v. Lamoreaux, 241
Mich. 226, 217 N. W. 54 (1928). Unless the collateral writing make3 tho
instrument expressly subject to an executory agreement, it should more
properly be held negotiable and the collateral writing considered only a
reference to its origin. Cf. Doyle v. Considine, 195 IMI. App. 311 (1916);
Internation al Finance Co. v. Northwesbtcr Drug Co., 282 Fed. 920 (D.
Minn. 1922); (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 665. But see Simpson, Implied Con-
ditions as Affecting Negotiability (1930) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 683. More-
over, since most instruments arise out of executory transactions, a reference
to such transaction 'appearing on the face should not carry notice of de-
fenses. Cf. Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Chicago Trust & Savings Banl,; 131
Ill. 569, 23 N E. 417 (1890); Snelling State Bank v. Clacsn, 132 Minn.
404, 157 N. W. 643 (1916). Hence, it is usually held that mere knowledge
of such executory consideration not only does not affect the form but does
not carry notice. Strand A~musenmnt Co. v. Fox, 205 Ala. 183, 87 S. E.
332 (1921) ; Beneficial Loan Ass'n v. Hillery, 95 N. J. L. 271, 113 Ad. 324
(1921); International Finance Co. v. Northwestern Drug Co., supra. The
collateral writing on the note in the instant case did not expressly mahe
payment conditional. Cf. Musto v. Grosican, 281 Pac. 1022 (C1. 1929).
Nor was there applicable in this state any special statutory provision de-
claring notes non-negotiable when given for shares. Cf. Jones Drug Co.
v. Williams, 139 Miss. 170, 103 So. 810 (1925); Hayter v. Dinsmore, 125
Kan. 749, 265 Pac. 1112 (1928). Since in most states shares may be
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created in (7. change for notes, the courts would seem to have no reason
to imply a condition from this fact alone. Cf. Beneficial Loan Ass'n v.
Hillery, .aupra; Bank of East Chattanooga, v. Clayton, 206 Ala. 518, 90 So.
899 (1921) ; Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 706, 710, et seq. The conflict
of decisions and such apparently unwarranted holdings as that in the
instant case could be avoided by a more precise re-wording of § 3
of the Negotiable Instruments Law. See Kent, Some Further Necessary
Amendments to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 22 ILL.
L. REV. 833. Such a revision should state expressly that reference on the
face of the instrument to an executory agreement does not of itself imply
a condition so as to render the instrument non-negotiable.
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw-GoVERNOR'S REMOVAL PownML-The plaintiff was
appointed by the governor of Kentucky to serve on the state text-book com-
mission. He was subsequently removed by the governor before the conven-.
ing of the next regular session of the senate at which the appointment was
subject to confirmation. A statute provided that "no person appointed to an
office by the governor, by and with the consent of the senate," should be
removed unless for official misconduct. [KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 3750]
The plaintiff sought to enjoin the recognition of his successor and the trial
court allowed a temporary injunction. On appeal to the state supreme
court it was decided that the removal power was impliedly limited by the
statute to appointees confirmed by the senate, and the temporary injunction
was made permanent. McChesney v. Sampson, 23 S. W. (2d) 584 (Ky.
1980).
It is now well settled that the power of appointing administrative officers
granted the president of the United States includes an unrestricted power
to remove. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926);
2 WmLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1929) §§ 995-999. But a
state governor, as chief executive, has no such power of removal unless it
is conferred by the state constitution or provided for by statute. State ex.
rel. Lyon v. Rhame, 92 S. C. 455, 75 S. E. 881 (1912) ; State V. Pritchard,
36 N. J. L. 101 (1873). See Fairlee, The State Governor (1912) 10 Micn.
L. REv. 370, 458; Tuttle, Removal of Public Officers from Office for Cause
(1905) 3 MicH. L. REv. 290, 341. And even such power may be exercised
only in the exact manner and upon the specific conditions authorized by the
constitution or statute. People ex rel. Mead v. Treasurer of Ingham, Coun-
ty, 36 Mich. 415 (1877) ; State ex rel. Campbell v. Board of Police Commis-
sioners, 88 Mo. 144 (1885). Moreover despite the fact that the governor
may be expressly empowered to remove "for cause," notice and hearing be-
fore removal are generally required. Dullam v. Willson, 53 Mich. 392, 19
N. W. 112 (1884); State ex rel. Hastings v. Smith, 35 Neb. 13, 52 N. W.
700 (1892) ;, State ex rel. Denison v. City of St. Louis, 90 Mo. 19, 1 S. W.
757 (1886). Contra: Bynum v. Strain, 95 Okla. 45, 218 Pac. 883 (1923);
People v. Wilcox, 90 111. 186 (1878). It has been suggested that in the in-
terest of efficient administration a power of summary removal should be
provided in the state as well as in the national government. Goodnow, The
Executive and the Courts (1886) 1 POL. Smi. Q. 533. Certainly the present
tendency is to increase the importance and power of the chief executive.
See DODD, STATE GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1928) 562 et seq. The decision of
the court in the instant case imposes upon the governor a restriction which
was obviously not intended by the legislature. The reason and necessity
for the exercise of the removal power would seem to apply equally well
whether the senate has ratified the appointment or not. It hardly appears
reasonable to withold such power where only the governor has scrutinized
the qualifications of an appointee and to confer it where the appointee's
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competency for office has been investigated by both the senate and governor.
Without an unrestricted power of removal, it is unjust to hold the gover-
nor responsible for the efficiency of the commission's administration and the
conduct in office of executive appointees. See Fairlee, The State Gorcrnor
(1912) 10 MICH. L. Rnv. 462. Even if the court in the instant case had
construed the statute so as to allow the governor the power of removing
an appointee not yet passed upon by the senate, the plaintiff was not with-
out protection against an arbitrary or capricious exercise of this power.
See People eX Tel. Johnson v. Coffey, 237 Mich. 591, 598, 213 N. W. 460, 462
(1927); State, en el. Wolfe -. Sanders, 118 S. C. 498, 509, 110 S. E. 808,
.12 (1920); Note (1927). 52 A. L. R. 1, 4, 24.
CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEF OF THIRD PEwSONs-GIrr PROMs-RIGHT
-OF PROMISEE TO SUBSTANTiAL DwrAos.-Plaintiffs and defendant entered
into an agreement whereby the former were to organize a corporation to
engage in business, provide it with ?40,000 as working capital, enter into
its employ and devote their best efforts to its management and operation.
Defendant was to provide the corporation with Qy60,000 as worldng capital
and use his best efforts to secure business for it In a suit for damages for
non-performance, defendant claimed that if any right of action existed,
it was in the corporation as such, and not in the plaintiffs. The district
-court, on motion of the defendant, dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. On appeal, it was held (one judge dissenting)
that the complaint set forth a valid contract, supported by the mutual
promises as consideration, and that the breach as alleged created a right
to substantial damages. Eden v. Miller, 37 F. (2d) 8 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
Since the promisee of a contract of the so-called "donee-beneficiary"
type ordinarily suffers no direct pecuniary loss by the non-performance
of the promisor, he logically has a right to nominal damages only. West
-v. Houghton, 4 C. P. D. 197 (1879); see Watson v. Randall, 20 Wend.
201, 203 (N. Y. 1838); Muncie Gas Co. v. City, 160 Ind. 97, 110, 66 N. E.
436, 441 (1903); 1 WLISTOXN, CONTRACTS (1920) § 357. An alternative
remedy is rescission of the contract, and recovery of the consideration.
See Spalding io. Henshawe, 80 Ky. 55, 59 (1882); Adams v. Union R. R.,
21 R. I. 134, 137, 42 AtM 515, 516 (1899). But even in the limited number
of situations where it is possible to regain the status quo, this remedy
is inadequate, for it gives the promisor the privilege of non-performance
if he later considers that it will be advantageous to refuse to perform. See
Whittier, Contract Beneficiaries (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 790, 793. The
equitable remedy of specific performance is frequently effective, and its
use seems to have become more popular in recent times. Peel V. Peel, 17
W. R. 586 (1869); Holder v. Aston, 2 Ch. 420 (1920); Wdull v. Paradcso,
188 N. Y. Supp. 287 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Groker v. N. Y. Trust Co., 245 N. Y.
17, 156 N. E. 81 (1927). It has been suggested that such proceeding in
equity is the most practical and desirable solution of the problem. WILas-
ToN, op. cit. supr% §§ 358, 359; (1927) '41 HAW. L. Ry. 97. But the
remedy has obvious limitations, for its availability depends entirely upon
the nature of the promise to be enforced. Some cases, mainly in England,
have allowed the promisee full recovery at law on a fictitious theory that
he acts as trustee for the beneficiary. Lloyds v. Harper, 16 Ch. D. 290
(1880); In re Flave,25 Ch. D. 89 (1883); People v. Slocum, 1.Idaho 62
(1866). The decisions may be justified on the ground that they effect a
recognition of the right of the beneficiary in jurisdictions which expressly
deny such right, but since performance is in fact promised to another, the
conception of a trust is purely fiction. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit
of Third Persons (1930) 46 L. Q. RE-. 12. In a few cases, for the most
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part involving benefit insurance policies, where performance is due a mem-
ber of the immediate family of the promisee, he has been allowed full
recovery in spite of the difficulty of finding a direct monetary injury.
O'Neill v. Supreme Council, 70 N. J. L. 410, 57 Atl. 463 (1904); McCarthy
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 Mass. 254, 38 N. E. 435 (1894); Van-
dlea.e v. Clark, 118 Ind. 61, 20 N. E. 527 (1889); McAllister's Adm'r v.
Bronaugh, 113 S. W. 821 (Ky. 1908). See Corbin, Contracts for the Bene-
fit of Third Persons (1918) 27 YAIE L. J. 1008, 1023. Where the promisee
has in fact suffered substantial injury, however, there would seem to be no
valid objection to granting him recovery, and thus achieving the same
result as in the -',editor-beneficiary cases. CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am.
L. Inst. 1928) § 135 (b). The present case and a few others similarly in-
volving the formation of corporations appear to support this view. Camp
v. Gress, 250 U. S.'308, 39 Sup. Ct. 478 (1919); Queen v. Benesch, 191 App.
Div. 83, 180 N. Y. Supp. 856 (1st Dep't 1920). In these cases the pecuniary
damage is fairly obvious, including value of services rendered, money lost
in the venture, loss of business standing, and loss of reasonably expected
profits. Moreover, where damages aro thus awarded to the promisce, the
remote possibility of double responsibility is precluded by the modern pro-
cedure permitting the defendant to implead all parties interested. The in-
stant court is to be commended for its refusal to allow the incidental exist-
ence of an artificial person, the corporation, to obscure the real issue,
inasmuch as the promisees and the beneficiary were in fact identical.
COURT MARTIAL-JURISDICTION OvER DEFENDANT AND APPELLATE REVIEW.
-Defendant was drafted for military service, but no notice of his physical
qualification was mailed to him, nor was the result of his physical examin-
ation posted on the classification list as required. Entrainment orders on
an obsolete form were mailed and never received, but the entrainment date
was posted on the classification list. Defendant failed to report for en-
trainment and was tried for desertion by court martial; he pleaded un-
lawful induction into military service, but was convicted. Thereupon he
sued out a writ of habeas corpus which was dismissed. On appeal the de-
cision was reversed, the court holding that, since notice of physical qualifi-
cation was a prerequisite to lawful induction into military service, court
martial was without jurisdiction, and such lack of jurisdiction could not be
waived. Vermehren v. Sirmyer, 36 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
The Articles of War provide that, except in time of war, offenders in
military service who are punishable by the law of the land should, upon
proper application, be tried by the civil magistrates. 41 STAT. 803 (1920), 10
U. S. C. § 1546 (1926); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 2 (1866). The phrase
"in time of war," however, is construed wherever possible in favor of mili-
tary jurisdiction. Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1, 40 Sup. Ct. 3 (1921)
(after armistice but before peace declared); Ex parte King, 246 Fed. 868
(E. D. Ky. 1917) (in time of war in a peaceful locality). But cf. Caldwell v.
Parker, 252 U. S. 376, 40 Sup. Ct. 380 (1920) (petitioner in military service
sentenced by state court in time of war in locality free from hostilities). The
jurisdiction of court martial is further limited to persons in the military
service and those "in the field" with the army. 41 STAT. 787 (1920), 10 U. S.
C. § 147 ('926). But this section has likewise been construed in favor of
military jur,sdiction. Ex parte Gerlack, 247 Fed. 616 (S. D. N. Y. 1918)
(jurisdictio:, over shipping board employee volunteering to stand watch
aboard tran sport in war zone); Hines v. Mikell, 259 Fed. 28 (C. C. A. 4th,
1919) (jur-kdiction over stenographer at training camp); cf. Ex parto
liitz, 256 Fed. 58 (D. Mass. 1919) (no jurisdiction over driver of auto-
',i-bile, eymri.,yed by training camp contractor). When the accused does
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not come within this section, court martial has no jurisdiction, nor can such
lack of jurisdiction be waived. 22 OP. ATr'Y GEN. 137 (1897). But cf.
Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 Johns. 150 (N. Y. 1814) ; HAwES, JUISDICTION
OF CouRTs (1886) 14. A state court cannot review a decision of court mar-
tial. Tarble's Case, 80 U. S. 397 (1871). A federal court may do so, how-
ever, but only as to questions involving the illegal composition, proceeding,
or jurisdiction of the court. Runkle v. U. S., 122 U. S. 543, 7 Sup. Ct. 1141
(1887); McClaughry v. Doming, 186 U. S. 49, 22 Sup. Ct. 786 (1902);
Crouch v. U. S., 13 F. (2d), 348 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926). So a decision prop-
erly reached by a court martial lawfully constituted can only be reviewed
with regard to jurisdiction over the individual. To prove the lack of such
jurisdiction it is generally necessary to attack the process of induction into
military service. But the federal courts appear: reluctant to seize upon
technical omissions in this process to grant writs of habeas corpus. In vo
Davison, 21 Fed. 618 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1884) (minor deserter enlisted with-
out the consent of dependent mother); Ez parte Thisret, 268 Fed. 472 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1920) (deserter failed to file one of several papers necessary for
exemption to which he was entitled); Ex parte Kerekes, 274 Fed. 870 (E.
D. Mich. 1921) (deserter wrongfully inducted after obtaining exemption as
non-declarant alien) ; U. S. v. Rice, 281 Fed. 326 (S. D. Tex. 1922) (notice
of draft never received). But cf. Farley v. Ratliff, 267 Fed. 782 (C. C. A.
4th, 1920) (when notice of draft is never received, defendant may demand
civil court trial, after cessation of hostilities). The undue severity of court
martial decisions commends the instant case. It -would seem that, in those
localities in which civil courts are in session and where immediate hostilitie3
do not make military strictness of law an indispensable necessity, a prisoner
tried by court martial should be permitted to avail himrelf of any ordinary
ground of appeal rather than be limited to jurisdictional pleas and techni-
calities which are infrequently granted. Cf. Ex parte Milligan, supra;
Caldwell v. Parker, supra.
CRIMINAL LAw-PLEADING-PLEA IN ABATEMENT-IMaGULAfl O NzA-
TION OF GRAND JuRy AS GROUND FOR IL ,sAL.-he defendant va in-
dicted for selling intoxicating liquors. A vacancy in the grand jury before
returning the indictment had been filled by calling a bystander instead of
notifying the clerk to draw additional names from the jury-box as provided
by statute. [IND. ANN. STAT. (Burnt, 1926) § 580J The defondant's plea
in abatement was overruled and he was found guilty. On appeal the judg-
ment was reversed (one justice dissenting) with directions that the plea be
sustained since the grand jury had not been legally organized. Eshelman
v. State, 169 N. E. 861 (Ind. 1930).
Irregularities in drawing, selecting, summoning, or impanelling a grand
jury arelgenerally held insufficient grounds for reversal, unless the appel-
lant can show such errors to have been prejudicial. Gravitt v. State, 279
Pac. 968 (Okla. Cr. App. 1929); Gaughan v. United States, 19 F. (2d) 897
(C. C. A. 8th, 1927); 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL PnoCEDUnE (10th ed. 1918)
§ 1277 (2); Cf. CANADA CRIb. CODE (1927) § 899; 1 NEW ZEALAND CONS.
STAT. (1908) § 418. The presence of a disqualified juror, however, is held
by these courts to be sufficient basis for reversal, although only those ex-
pressly excluded by statute from service on the grand jury will be found
disqualified. Crowley v. United States, 194 U. S. 461, 24 Sup. Ct. 731
(1904); State v. Barkley, 151 S. E. 733 (N. C. 1930); cf. Sledge i. State,
208 Ala. 154, 93 So. 875 (1922) (cousin of injured party not disqualified);
Zell v. State, 15 Ohio App. 446 (1922) (father of prosecutrix in indictment
for rape not disqualified). A minority of courts, as illustrated by the in-
stant case, in interpreting the statutes defining the method of selecting and
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impanelling the grand jury as mandatory rather than merely directory, hold
any technical departure from the prescribed method to be reversible error,
even though no bias or prejudice is shown. Doss v. State, 123 So. 23
(Ala. 1929) (jury cards stacked instead of drawn); cf. Smith v. State,
188 Ind. 501, 124 N. E. 698 (1919) (bystander called). All jurisdictions,.
however, hold that delayed objections to the constitution of the jury are
unavailing. Crosswy v. State, 157 Tenn. 363, 8 S. W. (2d) 486 (1928)
(plea filed two days after denial of continuance held properly stricken);
Agnew v. United States, 165 U. S. 36, 17 Sup. Ct. 235 (1897) (plea dis-
allowed when filed five days after indictment returned); see Smith v. State,
supra at 504, 124 N. E. at 699. Moreover, defects must be pleaded with
great particularity, anticipating all such matter as would defeat the plea
if alleged by the State. Randolph v. State, 162 N. E. 656 (Ind. 1928);
State v. Lowe, 164 N. E. 857 (Ind. 1929). These defects may properly be
challenged by the plea in abatement. Hicks v. State, 97 Fla. 199, 120 So.
330 (1929): Dose v. State, supra; 2 BisHoP, NEw CRIMINAL PRocEDunE
(2d ed. 1913). §§ 883, 889. But of. Bitting v. State, 165 Ga. 55, 139 S. E..
877 (1927). The American Law Institute, however, has proposed abolish-
ing the plea and leaving all objections to irregularities in the constitution
of the grand jury to be taken by motion to quash the indictment or informa-
tion. 2 CRIMINAL PRoCEmE RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926) e. 9, §§ 215,
216 (2). One state has already adopted this procedure. DEL. LAWS
(1925) c. 239, § 4847A. Indeed the general tendency seems to be to limit
the use of the plea wherever possible. See United States v. Goldman, 28 F.
(2d) 424, 426 (D. Conn. 1928) (plea limited to matter dehors record);
Morse v. State, 22 Ala. App. 93, 112 So. 806 (1927); ALA. CODE (1923)
§ 5202; CANADA CM0 . COu (1927) §§ 900, 905. It is, as the instant case
too pointedly illustrates, but another procedural method by which advan-
tage may be taken of a purely technical error to pigeonhole a criminal trial,
and the restriction of its scope would -at least reduce the opportunity for
unwarranted delay afforded by those jurisdictions which elevate a more-
procedural slip to the dignity of a reversible error. Qf Hiscock, Criminal
L~w and Procedure (1926) 26 COL. L. Rgv. 253; (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 893.
EVIDENCE--FAmILY LAw-DvoRc_--ADMIssInLTY, OF EVIDENCE OF
ILLEGrrIMACY.-The defendant in a divorce action sought to introduce evi-
dence of non-access to his wife during the year in which a child was born to
her. The evidence was excluded by the trial court. On appeal, it was held
that the evidence should have been admitted under a statute permitting,
parties to testify to all matters in divorce causes. Adams v. Adams, 148
Atl. 287 (Vt. 1930).
At common law husband and wife were incompetent to testify for or
against each other, the disqualification being based on their interest in the
suit, or on the public desire to preserve domestic tranquillity. Stapleton v.
Crofts, 18 A. & E. (N. s.). 367 (1852); 1 WIGMOIRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923).
§ 601; 5 JONES, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) § 2128. And where the evidence
of a parent tended to challenge the legitimacy of offspring born during wed-
lock, it was held inadmissible as offensive to decency, morality and policy.
Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591 (1777) ; Mink v. State, 60 Wis. 583, 19 N.
W. 445 (1884) ; People v. Case, 171 Mich. 282, 137 N. W. 55 (1912) ; (1924)'
19 ILL. L. REv. 280; (1924) 73 U. PA. L. REV. 71. Statutes today remove
these common law disqualifications in varying degrees. See Evans v. State,
165 Ind. 369, 373, 74 N. E. 244 (1905); JONES, op. cit. supra, § 2138 et seq.
In divorce cases, where domestic tranquillity is already a lost cause, and
where the spouses are clearly the most important witnesses, the complete-
removal of the disqualification of husband and wife seems the sensible
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course. "See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evi-
dence: Family Relations (1929) 13 MmNl. L. Rv. 675. But even in the
face of statutes permitting parties to a divorce suit to testify to all perti-
nent matters, the courts show a reluctance to disregard the common law
,disqualification where illegitimacy is concerned. Cf. RusccU v. RtuscU,
[1924] A. C. 687. The instant decision represents a straightforward attempt
-to uncover relevant facts, regardless of eighteenth century ideas of morality
and policy. But the suggested limitation of the admissibility of such evi-
dence to divorce cases "where legitimacy of the child is only an incidental
matter" may often produce the incongruous result that a child will be de-
clared a bastard for purposes of a divorce suit, yet be legitimate in a suit
brought especially to determine its status.
INSURANCE-PART PAYMENT "IN FULL SATISFACTION" UNDEn FACILITY
CLAuss--Suit was brought by the administratrix of the insured upon an
industrial insurance policy for $392 payable to the insured's executor or ad-
ministrator, unless already paid to "any relative . . . or to any person
appearing to the company to be equitably entitled to the same." The policy
-provided that "production of a receipt signed by any or either of such per-
sons shall be conclusive evidence . . . that all claims have been fully
satisfied." In defense to the action the defendant produced a receipt for
$275 given by the sister of the decedent "in full satisfaction." The court,
affirming the judgment of the Appellate Division, awarded the balance of
the insurance money to the plaintiff on the ground that the sister, having
no claim, could not release the company as against those who held the
-claim on receipt of less than the full amount. McCarthy v. Prudential Inz.
Co., 169 N. E. 645 (N. Y. 1930).
Courts have generally recognized the validity of the "facility" clause in
industrial insurance policies despite indefiniteness as to the beneficiary and
a possible absence of an insurable interest. HuEuYNn, LWE INSURNCZ
(1925) 418; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. -v. Nelson, 170 Ky. 674, 186 S. W.
520 (1916); see Zornow v. Prudential Ins. Co., 210 App. Div. 339, 342, 206
N. Y. Supp. 92, 94 (4th Dep't 1924) ; (1924) 9 MN. L. REV. 288. But the
insurer's selection of a beneficiary must not be arbitrary or capricious. Zor-
now v. Prudential Ins. Go., supra (payment to irresponsible landlady
promising to pay funeral expenses not a discharge); see McDanicls v. West-
ern & Southern Ins. Co., 247 Ill. App. 522, 527 (1928). Unless designated
as a beneficiary by the insurer, no one of the persons to whom the company
is privileged to pay has a right of action against the insurer. Metropolitan
Life Ivs. Co. v. Chappell, 151 Tenn. 299, 269 S. W. 21 (1925) ; Wihliard v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 276 Pa. 427, 120 Atl. 461 (1923) (recovery denied de-
spite possibility of insurer's escaping liability entirely due to prohibitive
cost of administration papers). But when the insurer has once selected
a payee by notification or otherwise, it may be compelled to pay the party
chosen. Tarasowski v. Prudential Ins. Co., 113 Misc. 248, 184 N. Y. Supp.
264 (Sup. Ct. 1920); La Raw v. Prudential Ins. Co., 12 F. (2d) 140 (Ct.
of App. D. C. 1926) (plaintiff paid premiums relying upon agent's promise
of proceeds); Rustin -v. Prudential Ins. Co., 161 N. E. 561 (Ohio 1928). The
named beneficiary may compel payment if the insurer has not exercised its
option before suit is brought. Williams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 233
S. W. 288 (Mo. App. 1921). Full payment in good faith, however, to any-
one in accordance with the facility provision operates as a complete dis-
charge of the insurer's obligations. Jones' Adm'r v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
225 Ky. 238, 8 S. W. (2d) 412 (1928) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bates,
130 Miss. 399, 94 So. 216 (1922). Even partial payment in full satisfac-
tion to one within the clause has been held, contrary to the instant case, to
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be a complete defense to suit by a named beneficiary. Brennan v. Pr'uden-
tial Ins. Co., 170 Pa. 488, 32 Atl. 1042 (1895); Sheridan v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 128 Ill. App. 519 (1906); cf. Hann v. Bretter, 107 N. Y. Supp. 78, 80
(Sup. Ct. 1907) (debtor without notice of assignment of debt discharged
by compromise with assignor). But see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Brock, 48
App. D. C. 4, 10 (1918). In order to maintain low premiums it is eco-
nomically essential that the insurer be exempted from the costly procedure
of tracing the beneficiary. But even where valid grounds for compromise
exist, if partial settlements are permitted to discharge insurance companies
from their obligation to pay out the face value of small industrial policies,
an opportunity is thereby provided for securing releases from distant rela-
tives for a mere pittance. See Sheridan v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra at
523; instant case at 647. Furthermore, as the court suggests in the instant
decision, since an unnamed beneficiary can generally not bring suit on
such a policy, it is difficult to find a legal theory upon which the insurer
can base a. claim of compromise.
PATENTS--PATENTABILITY--"FUNCTION OF A MACHINE."-The plaintiff
patented a device for use on automobiles, the purpose of which was to main-
tain a suction brake at constant pressure until released. The movement of
the brake piston, through a lever, automatically moved a follow-up device
to cover the suction aperture of a three-Way valve. The defendant also
used a suction brake, but it was held at constant pressure by an automatic
device whereby the movement of the brake piston actuated one arm of a
split lever which pulled back and closed the suction valve. In a suit for
infringement the district court found the plaintiff's patent valid but not in-
fringed. On appeal the judgment was affirmed (one judge dissehting) on
the ground that the plaintiff's patent claims could not ba construed so as
to protect the "function" of his machine. Bragg-Kliesrath Corporation v.
Farrell, 36 F. (2d) 845 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
It is an ancient principle of patent law that the claims of an inventor's
patent can protect no more than his own invention. Brunton v. Hawks, 4
B. & Aid. 541 (1821) ; Evans v. Eaton, 7 Wheat. 356 (U. S. 1822). On the
basis of this principle, the rule was first formulated that the function of a
machine is not patentable. Wyeth v. Stone, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,107 (C. C.
Mass. 1840) (inventor of an ice-cutting machine not privileged to patent
all mechanical means of cutting ice). The rule has since been adopted as
the apparent ratio decidendi of many important decisions, but its meaning
has grown cloudy with use, and its proper application has become difficult
and uncertain. See Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 252, 268 (U. S. 1853)
(function defined as the "abstract effect of a machine"); Riodon Iron &
Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U. S. 68, 77, 15 Sup. Ct. 745, 748 (1895)
(function defined as the "operation of a piece of mechanism"); 1 HOPKINS,
PATENTS (1911) § 37 (function distinguished from both "result" and "mode
of operation"); cf. Westinghouse" v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U. S.
537, 18 Sup. Ct. 707 (1898) (attempt to clarify the situation resulting in a
five to four decision). The problem is further complicated by an equally
respectable line of decisions which have sustained "process" patents cover-
ing generalized descriptions of the operations and effects of machines.
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707 (1880) (chemical changes); The Tele-
phone Cases, 126 U. S. 1, 8 Sup. Ct. 778 (1888) (electric currents); Ex-
panded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 652 (1909) (me-
chanical operations). These cases would seem to indicate that the function
of a machine, however defined, is in fact patentable if it sufficiently fulfills
the statutory requisites of novelty and utility. 29 STAT. 692 (1897), 35 U.
S. C. § 31 (1926). Another aspect of the problem is presented by the many
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cases which hold that a machine which performs the same function as the
patentee's machine in substantially the same manner is a "mechanical
equivalent" and therefore an infringement. Read Mach. Co. v. Jarburg,
221 Fed. 662 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); 1 WALUEP, PATEu-rs (6th ed. 1929) § 417.
If the patentee's machine is but a minor improvement in an already well-
developed art.it will be allowed only a narrow range of equivalents. Cf.
McCormick v. Talcott, 20 How. 402 (U. S. 1857); Dashiell v. Grosvenor,
162 U. S. 425, 16 Sup. Ct. 805 (1896). But if it is a "pioneer" inven-
tion the words "substantially similar" may cover important differences and
even improvements of structure and operation. Cf. Morley Sewing Machino
Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U. S. 263, 9 Sup. Ct. 299 (1889); Gould Coupler Co.
-. Pratt, 70 Fed. 622 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1895) (court admittedly influenced
to allow a wide range of equivalents to an automatic coupling device
because it had made railroading safe for trainmen). In so far as the
courts avail themselves of the convenient elasticity of the doctrine of
mechanical equivalents, they seem here also to be protecting, to some
extent at least, the functions of machines. Thus in the instant case,
the court, without violence to precedent, might have regarded the applica-
tion of constant pressure, instead of the cutting off of suction, as the "func-
tion" of the machines; the stopping of suction by an automatic connection
with the brake piston as their "substantially similar" modes of operation;
and their levers and valves as "mechanical equivalents." That the dis-
senting judge did so regard them merely indicates that he was less im-
pressed than the majority by the ingenuity of the defendant's device, and
more by the value of the plaintiff's contribution to the automobile industry.
This and other dissents in similar cases seem to give color-to the con-
tention that the rules herein considered are not absolute tests of patent-
ability or infringement, but rather the necessarily imperfect means by
which the courts express their estimates of the relative merits of the
inventions between which they must chooce. Cf. dissent in instant case
supra at 854; dissent in Westinghouse -v. Boyden, Power Brao Co., supra
at 573, 18 Sup. Ct. at 724; dissent in McCormick v. Talcott, iupra at 408.
BILEADING--AIENDMENTS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-NEY7 CAUSn Or
ACTION.-The plaintiff's intestate brought suit under a state statute to re-
cover for injuries sustained during the course of his employment by the
defendant railroad. He obtained a 'favorable judgment in the trial court
but died while an appeal was pending before the state supreme court. The
decision of the trial court was affirmed [192 Ind. 199, 134 N. E. 858 (1922)]
and the plaintiff, the administratrix and wife of the deceased, was substi-
tuted as respondent on certiorari issued by the Supreme Court of the United
States. This court held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act E35
STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. §§ 351-59 (1926)] rather than the state law
applied to the action, and the case was remanded. 263 U. S. 540, 44 Sup.
Ct. 165 (1924). Three years after the death of the intestate, when the case
was back in the court of first instance, the plaintiff filed an amended com-
plaint in which she alleged, for the first time, the death of the intestate as
having arisen from the injuries which he sustained. She was successful
in securing a judgment on the basis of this amended complaint, which judg-
ment was affirmed by the state supreme court. 163 N. E. 99 (Ind. 1928).
The Supreme Court of the United States, on certiorari, reversed this de-
cision upon the ground that the amendment introduced a new cause of
action and was therefore barred by the two year period of limitations con-
tained in the Federal Employers' Liability Acts. Baltimore & Ohio .. W.
R. R. v. Carroll, 50 Sup. Ct 182 (U. S. 1930).
Generally, an amendment to a complaint which introduces a new ' cause
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of action" does not relate back to the time of the original suit and thus
aoid the bar of a statute of limitations. 2 WOOD, LIMITATIONS (4th ed.
19It) § 307 (1). Bat the inability of courts and text writers to agree upon
what constitutes a !ngle cause of action has made it almost impossible to
determine when a new cause of action has been introduced. See Clark,
The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 817; McCaskill, Actions
and Causes of Actions (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 614; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES
(4th ed. 1904) § 347. In keeping with the code ideal of fact rather than
issue pleading, the modern tendency has been to look upon a "cause of ac-
tion" as merely a convenient grouping of operative facts which give rise to
one or more "rights of action." See Clark, op. cit. supra; PHILLIPS, CODE
PLEADING (1896) § 30 et seq.; (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 506. Under this liberal
view a change in the legal theory involved or a slight change in the opera-
tive facts does not constitute a new "cause of action." Recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court had seemingly adopted this liberal con-
ception of the term "cause of action" as distinct from "right of action"
with a resulting liberality in permitting amendments. Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. v. WuIf, 226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135 (1913) ; N. Y. Central R. R. v.
Kinney, 260 U. S. 340, 43 Sup. Ct. 122 (1922) ; see Comment (1927) 36 YALE
L. J. 853, n. 13; (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 586. But cf. Boston & Maine Ry.
v. Hurd, 108 Fed. 116 (C. C. A. 1st, 1901); Anderson v. Wetter, 103 Me.
257, 69 Atl. 105 (1907). But the court in the instant case apparently re-
turns to the view that two rights of action necessarily give rise to two
causes of action. See C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Wills Dickey Trust Co., 275 U. S.
161, 162, 48 Sup. Ct. 73 (1927); ef. St. Louis, L M. & S. Ry. v. Craft, 237
U. S. 648, 35 Sup. Ct. 704 (1915). But ef. Louisville & Nashville R. R. v.
Echols, 203 Ala. 627, 84 So. 827 (1919); City of Bradford v. Donis, 126
Pa. 622, 17 Atl. 884 (1889). Considered in the light of the purpose
intended to be served by the statute of limitations, the instant decision
seems somewhat harsh. The period of limitation in the Federal Employers'
Liability Act serves to protect a defendant from undue hardship in the
preparation of defenses to a long delayed personal injury action. But since
the fact of the intestate's death was known to the defendant by reason of
the substitution of the present plaintiff, the instant amendment would
hardly be likely to surprise the defense counsel. Furthermore the rationali-
zation, which the court adopts to sustain its holding, in departing from the
liberal view of what constitutes a "clause of action", throws the whole field
of amendment in the federal courts into a state of confusion.
REAL PROPERTY-PIPED STREAM AS INCUMBRANCE.-A real estate sales
contract called for the delivery of a deed warranting the title to be free
from all incumbrances. The plaintiffs as vendees brought suit to recover
a down payment and for rescission of the contract, alleging that unknown
to them a small stream encompassed in a 24-inch underground pipe ran
diagonally across the lot. The defendant vendors cross-petitioned for
specific performance and had judgment in the Special Term. The Appellate
Division concluded that the stream constituted an incumbrance and re-
versed the judgment. Upon appeal, the stream was held to be a "natural"
stream and hence not a legal incumbrance. Rescission of the contract and
the recovery of the down payment were accordingly refused though the de-
fendant's petition for specific performance was likewise disallowed on ac-
count of hardship. Kleinberg v. Ratett, 252 N. Y. 236, 169 N. E. 289
(1929).
The presence of a natural surface-stream on land conveyed or contracted
to be conveyed does not constitute a breach of a covenant against incum-
brances. Lei'cnbcrg v. Johnson, 224 Mass. 297, 112 N. E. 870 (1916);
[Vol. 39,1068
RECENT CASE NOTES
Archer v. Archer, 84 Hun 297, 32 N. Y. Supp. 410 (Sup. Ct. 1895), aff'd,
155 N. Y. 415, 50 N. E. 55 (1898). But the presence of an invisible ease-
ment in the form of an artificial underground conduit does constitute a
breach of such a covenant Krotzer v. Clark, 178 Cal. 736, 174 Pac. 657
(1918) (oil pipe line); Thackeray v. Knight, 57 Utah 21, 192 Pac. 263
(1920) (water pipe line); cf. In re Puckett and Smith's Contract, [1902]
2 Ch. 258. The "piped" natural stream in the instant case resembles both
the natural stream aspect of the first group and the artificial conduit as-
pect of the second group of cases, yet the language of the court seems to
indicate that the two legal categories are mutually exclusive. Even as-
suming the natural aspect of the stream, the court fails to recognize the
probable practical difficulties with which the vendees are faced in the con-
struction of any cellar upon the property. Such a restriction upon the
use of th -real estate appears closely to resemble covenants against certain
kinds of building, which covenants, unless excepted in the contract of sale,
are held to be incumbrances admitting recovery of down payments and a
rescission of the purchase agreement. Cf. Burho v. Dorfan, 101 N. J. Eq.
84, 137 At. 844 (1927); Goodman v. Kortsch, 196 Wis. 70, 219 N. W. 354
(1928). The rigid classification of the instant court seems somewhat ar-
bitrary from still another angle. A riparian land owner is generally un-
der no duty to maintain the free flow of a "natural" stream even though
an upper riparian has a right of entry to remove obstructions. Prezcott v.
Williams, 5 Mete. 429 (Mass. 1843); Cobb v. Massachusctts Chemical Co.,
179 Mass. 423, 60 N. E. 790 (1901); 2 DnVLIN, DisnS (3d ed. 1911) § 908.
But by diverting, damming or altering the course of a natural stream, a
lower riparian comes under an active duty to upper riparians to maintain
free flowage. Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Red Feather Coal Co., 119 So. 606 (Ala.
1928); Olney v. Cululoo Park Co, 182 App. Div. 560, 169 N. Y. Supp. 843
(Sup. Ct. 1918). Since the course of the stream in question has been
altered by being enclosed in an underground pipe, upper riparians probably-
possess a right in the nature of an invisible- easement that the flow of the
water course be kept clear of obstructions by the vendees. Such invisible-
easements, unless excepted in the contract of sale or unless known to a
vendee, furnish sufficient grounds for rescission and recovery of dorm pay-
ments. Olney v. Culudoo Park Co., supra. It would seem that substantial
justice would more nearly have been approached had the court recognized:
the hybrid legal character of a piped natural stream and held it a legal in-
cumbrance as between the parties.
TB UsTS-CORPORATIONS--DECLARATION AFTER CoNvEYANcE TO ComRPOA-
TION IN WHICH SETTLOR WAS SOLE SHAnHOLDE.-The testator deeded cer-
tain land to a corporation in which he -was the sole shareholder. Later he
executed an instrument to the effect that the land was the property of his
son. When the testator died two years later, the son who was sole execu-
tor had possession of this paper and claimed by virtue of it that the corpo-
ration held the property in trust for him. Accordingly, when the land was
sold in the corporation's name, the son appropriated the proceeds of the
sale. The other heirs of the testator insisted that these proceeds be credited
to the assets of .the corporation as part of the estate and filed a bill object-
ing to the son's accounting as executor. The Surrogate found that the tea-
tator was not the owner of the property at the time he attempted Io create
the trust and held that no trust had been created. The Appellate Division
affirmed the finding that the land belonged to the company and ordered the
executor to account for the proceeds of the sale. On appeal, the judgment
was reversed (one judge dissenting) on the ground that a valid trust was-
created. In re Brown's Will, 252 N. Y. 366, 169 N. E. 612 (1930).
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It has been held that a declaration of trust need not be executed simul-
taneously with the creation of the trust. Hodge v. Joy,-207 Ala. 198, 92 So.
171 (1922) ; elark v. Kinnaugh, 99 N. J. Eq. 878, 133 Atl. 381 (1926). But
it is the universal rule that the writing must be executed while the settlor
is the owner of the property concerned. Stubbings v. Stubbings, 248 Ill.
406, 94 N. E. 54 (1911); BOGEzr, TRUSTS (1921) § 20. According to the
customary conception of corporate entity, the holder of all the shares of a
corporation is not considered the owner of the corporation's property in
that he may convey such property in his own name. Button v. Hoffman,
61 Wis. 20 (1884); Brock v. Poor, 216 N. Y. 387, 111 N; E. 229 (1915).
The result in the instant case was obviously achieved through a wise dis-
regard of the entity theory, so that the sole share-holder was assumed to
be the owner of property to which the corporation held the "legal title."
Moreover, in thus refusing to be bound by strict legal terminology, the court
is following a recent judicial tendency to interpret trust transactions
more broadly and effectuate wherever possible the clear intention of the
settlor. See Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N. Y. 245, 254, 139 N. E. 255, 258
(1923); Scott, Conveyances on Trusts Note Properly Declared (1924) 37
HAav. L. REv. 653, 688..
TRUSTS-STATUTE OF LIMrrATIONS-REPUDIATION.-The title to certain
real property was taken in the name of the deceased but the plaintiff con-
tributed nine tenths of the purchase price and met the payments on the
mortgage. In a suit against the deceased's executor to establish a resulting
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff, the defendant set up the statute of
limitations. The court, in reversing the decision of the lower court, found
a resulting trust, and held, inter alia, that a mere ldpse of time following
the creation of a resulting trust was insufficient to start ,the statute of
limitations running. Spring v. Spring, 229 N. W. 147 (Iowa 1930).
When the trustee of an express or resulting trust "repudiates" the trust,
the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the cestui has actual or
constructive notice of the "repudiation." Cavanaugh Bros. v. Gaston, 255
Mass. 587, 152 N. E. 623 (1926) (conveyance and mortgaging of trust
property); see Mann v. Bank of Greenfield, 20 S. W. (2d) 502, 508 (Mo.
1929). Repudiation may be an express disavowal of the trust. Cook v.
MacGinnis, .72 Mont. 280, 233 Pac. 129 (1925) ; see Schlosser v. Schlosser,
62 Colo. 270, 16Z Pac. 153, 154 (1917) (refusal of wife to convey property
of purchase-money trust to cestui). Yet it may take the form of acts by
the trustee which are inconsistent with the interests of the cestui and of
which the cestui has actual or constructive notice. Thus, a hostile convey-
ance of any part of the trust res is a sufficient repudiation to create a cause
of action. Hook v. Bank of Leland, 134 Miss. 185, 98 So. 594 (1924)
(transfer to a third party of shares held in trust); Marshall v. Hammock,
195 N. C. 498, 142 S. E. 777 (1928) (sale of part of trust property to
cestui) ; Couch v. Sparger, 252 S. W. 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ; of. Rickea
v. Rickes, 81 Ind. App. 533, 141 N. E. 486 (1923) (taking title to property
purchased with trust funds in name of another). But cf. Broderick & Cal-
vert v. Flannigan, 6 S. W. (2d) 8 (Ark. 1928) (mortgaging trust property
with knowledge of cestuis not repudiation because of possibility of assent
thereto). A devise of trust property has likewise been held a repudiation
where the will was probated with knowledge of the cestui. Lassiter v.
Bouche, 5 S. W. (2d) 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); cf. Garner v. Lankford,
147 Ga. 235, 93 S. E. 411 (1917) (trust property mingled with property
of trustee and administered by his administrator as trustee's property).
But cf. Devoe v. Lutz, 133 App. Div. 356, 117 N. Y. Supp. 339 (2d Dep't
1909) (making of a will not a repudiation since inflective until death of
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trustee-testator). But mere tacit failure of the trustee to perform some
duty has been held insufficient to constitute repudiation. Tibbala v. Keys,
281 Pac. 190 (Wyo. 1929) (failure of trustee to sell property as provided);
England v. Winslow, 196 Cal. 260, 237 Pee. 542 (1925) (failure to turn
over trust money to executor of cestui); cf. Ott v. Hood, 162 Wis. 97, 139
N. W. 762 (1913) (misrepresentations of attorney as to collection of
money). Permitting a trustee to retain possession of the trust fund beyond
the period of the trust has been held not to start the statute running. Jones
*v. Home Savings Bank, 118 Mich. 155, 76 N. W. 322 (1898) (statute does
not run until accounting). But of. Packer v. Overton, 200 Iowa 620, 203
N. W. 307 (1925) (statute of limitations runs against recovery of legacy
after settlement or order to pay); City of Centerville v. Turner County,
23 S. D. 424, 122 N. W. 350 (1909) (recovery of taxes collected by county
for city barred by retention for statutory period). Thus the determination
of what constitutes "repudiation" would appear to depend on the facts of
each particular case and the situation as between the parties in the instant
case would seem to afford ample justification for the court's conclusion
that no repudiation by the trustee had occurred.
TRusTs--TRUST OF REnALTY CORPORATION SHA -s--ALLeATiON F DIm-
DENDS RESULTING FROM SALE OF LAND AT PaorTr.-A testator established
a trust consisting in part of shares in a realty company, the income of
which was to go to his widow for life. The realty company, having cold the
major portion of its property, declared a cash dividend of 100%, which
represented the entire proceeds from the sale. The testamentary trustee
petitioned the surrogate's court for a judicial determination of the rights
of the life tenant and the remaindermnan to the dividend. It va held that
the entire dividend should be allocated to the corpus of the trust, since It
resulted from an appreciation in value of the assets of the company, and a
liquidation of these assets. In, re Jackc on's Will, 135 Misc. 329, 239 X. Y.
Supp. 362 (Surr. Ct. 1929).
A cash dividend declared on shares held in trust must be added to the
corpus of the trust where such dividend represents an increase in the value
of "capital assets." Eisner's Appeal, 175 Pa. 143 (196); Gifford v. Thomp-
son, 115 Mass. 478 (1874). The determination of whether a dividend has
resulted from such an increase presents obvious coniplications. See Com-
ment (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 195, 197. * But where, as in the instant case, the
sole business of the corporation consists in the purchase and sale of real
estate, it is difficult to see how the excess of sale price over cost price of
such realty can be considered an increase in "capital assets" rather than
"profits," to some share of which the beneficiary would be entitled. Cf.
Estate of Oliver, 136 Pp. 43, 20 Atl. 527 (1890); Washington County Hos-
pital Ass'n v. Hagerstown Trust Co., 124 MId. .1, 91 AtL 787 (1914); Note
(1922) 7 CORN. L. Q. 182. But cf. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v.
Bradley, 41 R. I. 174, 103 Atl. 564 (1918). Under such a view of the
situation, had the dividend been an "ordinary" one the beneficiary would
have been entitled to the whole amount in any jurisdiction. See In ro
Schaefer, 178 App. Div. 117, 120, 165 N. Y. Supp. 19, 21 (1st Dep't 1917) ;
Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368, 374 (1857). According to the "Massa-
chusetts rule" the beneficiary would 1 e entitled to such a dividend, even
though "extraordinary," if it were paid in cash. Gray v. Hemenway, 206
Mass. 126, 92 N. E. 31 (1910); Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, 10 Sup.
Ct. 1057 (1890). Under the so-called "Pennsylvania rule," however, the
ife tenant is entitled only to such portion of the dividends as represents
"profits" accruing after the creation of the trust. In re Nirdlinger's Es-
tate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200 (1927); BOGERT, Tnusms (1921) 382. Such a
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result has been reached on facts similar to those in the instant case. In
re Gartenlaub's Estate, 185 Cal. 375, 197 Pac. 90 (1921) ; Mandeville's Es-
tate, 286 Pa. 368, 133 Atl. 562 (1926); cf. Matter of Osborne, 209 N. Y.
450, 103 N. E. 723 (1913). A New York statute passed after the creation
of the instant trust may be interpreted as an adoption of the "Massachu-
setts rule." N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (Supp. 1926) § 17a. But of.
Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 250 N. Y. 1, 164 N. E. 723 (1928) (statute
not retroactive). Since the instant corporation's only source of profit was
through selling its land holdings, the entire purpose of the testator will be
defeated by depriving the life tenant of any income whatsoever unless some
of the proceeds derived from such sales are allocated to the life tenant.
WILLS--LIFE ESTATE-POWER OF LIFE TENANT TO MAKE Gi.-The de-
fendant, the tenant of a life estate set up by her deceased husband, was
empowered by the terms of his will to "use, consume, and dispose" of the
property both as to income and principal. But the testator expressly pro-
hibited the defendant from disposing of the estate by will and provided for
an equal division of "whatever remains" among five designated remainder-
men. The defendant attempted to give away a portion of the corpus of the
estate to one of the residuary legatees. The other residuary legatees joined
in an action to have the deed of gift set aside, and on appeal the court,
affirming the judgment of the lower court, held that the defendant under
the terms of the will could dispose of the property only for her own use
or maintenance. Evans v. Leer, 23 S. W. (2d) 553 (Ky. 1930).
When a will provides for both a life estate and a limitation over of
"'whatever remains," a general power of disposition granted the life tenant
by the terms of the instrument carries with it the power to convey the
estate in fee for a valid consideration. Lucas v. McNeill, 231 Fed. 672 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1916); KALES, ESTATES (2d ed. 1920) § 648. But such general
powers of disposition do not normally permit a life tenant to-make a gift
of the inherited estate. Birge v. Westport Bank & Trust Co., 101 Conn. 39,
124 Atl. 846 (1924) (bank stocks); Pearson v. Oreutt, 106 Kan. 610, 189
Pac. 160 (1920) (farm); Bowser v. Mattler, 137 Ind. 649, 35 N. E. 701
(1893) (proceeds from sale of land); Blair v. Blair, 82 Kan. 464, 108 Pac.
827 (1910) (profits); cf. In re Ithaca Trust Co., 220 N. Y. 437, 116 N. E.
102 (1916) (court implied prohibition against disposition by will). Vari-
ous theories have been suggested to sustain the prohibition of gifts in this
situation. Johnson v. Johnmon, 51 Ohio St. 446, 38 N. E. 61 (1894) (life
tenant regarded as quasi-trustee for remaindermen); Gardner v. Whit-
ford, 23 R. I. 396, 50 At. 642 (1901) ("disposition" impliedly limited to
that necessary for support); Griffin v. Kitchen, 225 Mass. 331, 114 N. E.
431 (1917) (life tenant must act in good faith toward remaindermen). .It
would seem that such decisions actually turn upon the court's idea of the
testator's intention. Cf. Thrall v. Spear, 63 Vt. 266, 22 Atl. 414 (1891)
("customary" gifts permitted); Dana v. Dana, 185 Mass. 156, 70 N. E. 49
(190.!i ("use for comfort and happiness" allowed gifts to charity) ; Gibbes
v. IV.tson, 92 Miss. 9, 45 So. 5 (1907). By such provisions as found in
the will in the instant case, the testator probably desired that his wife
should be able to reach the principal of his estate if she found herself in
need of extra funds to meet an unforeseen difficulty or emergency. To
have allowed the defendant to make a gift of part of the estate to one of
the re-naindermen would have resulted in an unequal d'istribution of the
,roperty against which the testator specifically intended to provide.
WILLS-PRECATORY WORDS AS CREATING A TRusT.-After specific bequest:
to his brothers and sisters a testator added, "Instructions to Brothers an
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Sisters. Take care of brother Will." The last named brother claimed that
this created a precatory trust in his favor. The lower court found that
none was created. It was held on appeal that the words were not definite
or imperative and the judgment was affirmed. In re Lee's Estate, 284 Pac.
948 (Cal. 1930).
Precatory trusts are based on the idea that a provision in a will not
imperative in form may often have been so intended by the testator. Sea
Malin v. Keighley, 2 Ves. Jr. 529, 530 (1795) ("The mode is only civility") ;
(lifford v. Stewart, 95 Me. 38, 45, 49 AtL. 52, 54 (1901); PozmmoY, EQUn
JuRisPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 1015-1017. In early English decisions,
words of recommendation or desire raised a presumption that a trust was
intended. Massey v. Sherman, 1 Ambl. 4 (1739) ("not doubting but that");
Cholmondeley v. Clwlmondeley, 14 Sim. 590 (1845) ("earnestly recom-
mend"); Note (1925) 49 A. L. R. 22. This doctrine apparently originated
in the Roman law and was adopted by the early English courts. Sea In ra
Pennock, 20 Pa. 268, 275 (1853). Later English and American cases have
reversed the presumption. Lambe v. Eames, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 597 (1871)
("as she thinks best for the benefit of") ; In re Mart, 132 Cal. 666, 61 Pe.
964 (1900); see Snyder v. Toler, 179 Mo.,App. 376, 384, 166 S. W. 1059,
1062 (1914). It thus became necessary that precatory words approach the
imperative in order to create a trust. Dexter v. Young, 234 Mazs. 588, 125
N. E. 862 (1920) ("earnestly request") ; In re Sowash, 62 Cal. App. 512,
217 Pac. 123 (1923) ("this my dying request"); Temple v. Rtscll, 251
Mass. 231, 146 N. E. 679 (1925) ("testator's will and xviph"); ee Knight
v. Knight, 3 Beav. 148, 172 (1840). Words of recommendation to an exec-
utor concerning the disposition of the testator's property have been held
to create a trust. Board of Foreign Missions v. Culp, 151 Pa. 467, 25 At.
117 (1892) ("wish"); Inr e Bernheim.'s Estate, 82 Mont. 198, 266 Pa". 378
(1928) ("recommend"). A gift impliedly conditional on its disposition in
accordance with the preatory words has likewise been held to create a
trust, especially when the testator has some moral obligation towards the
beneficiary. In're Hamilton, 181 Cal. 758, 186 Pac. 587 (1919) ("request");
Warner v. Bates, 28 Mass. 274 (1867). But an unreasonable request or one
very difficult of administration will not give rise to a trust. Pierce v. Pierce,
114 Me. 311, 96 Atl. 143 (1914). And when the testator makes an absolute
bequest to a legatee, a subsequent request as to its disposition generally
does not cut down the legatee's estate by creating a trust Clark v. Baker,
91 Conn. 663, 101 Atl. 9 (1917); Broun v. Lewi, 150 S. E. 328 (N. C.
1929). Nor does a trust arise when words of request are used as to the
disposition of property not owned by the testator. Palmer v. Schribb, 2 Eq.
Cas. Abr. 291 (1713); Springs v. Springs, 182 N. C. 484, 109 S. E. 839
(1921). Moreover precatory words do not create a trust when an express
trust has been created by apt words elsewhere in the will. Kaufman v.
Gries, 141 Cal. 295, 74 Pac. 846 (1903) ("desire and request") ; In r Lynrc,
102 Misc. 650, 169 N. Y. Supp. 321 (Surr. Ct. 1918) ("direct"). And preca-
tory words as to the employment of designated persons are held to be mere
sanctions and not obligatory on the estate. Ramsdell v. O'Connell, 168 N. E.
793 (Mass. 1929); Scott, Testamentary Directions to Employ (1928) 41
HARv. L. REv. 709, 712, 725; (1929) 43 HARV. L. Ray. 148; PEMY, TRUSTS
(6th ed. 1911) § 123. Contra: Rivet v. Batistella, 167 La. 766, 120 So. 300
(1929). In determining whether such a trust has been created, the context
of the will as a whole and all the circumstances under which it was made
are taken into account. Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 8 Sup. CL. 1164
(1881) ("recommend and requet . .. as in her judgment shall be best") ;
Woodridge v. Gilman, 170 Ark. 163, 279 S. W. 20 (1926) ("fequest").
Thus the same words under different circumstar.cp ha,%? been held by the
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same court to create a trust in one case and not in another. Anderson v.
Hammond, 70 Tenn. 281 (1879) ("will and desire"); Ogilvie v. Wright,
140 Tenn. 114, 203 S. W. 753 (1918). The decisions suggest no workable
formula for determining in the abstract when words of request or hope
are to be regarded as mandatory. See Williams v. Williwms, 1 Sim. (N. s.)
358, 369 (1851). One court even bases its finding of a trust largely on con-
siderations of sound business policy in administering the estate. Matter of
the Estate of Ardrey, 332 N. Y. 109, 133 N. E. 369 (1921). A definite pre-
diction as to the outcome of a specific case is often impossible since the
situation is frequently one never envisaged by the testator and the only
criterion which the court has to guide it to a decision is its opinion of what
disposition of the property the testator would have made had he foreseen
the particular dispute.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-WORKING PARTNER AS "EmnYPE".-The
deceased, one of two partners engaged in a garage business employing
three men, was killed while occupied in his usual work as repair foreman.
Each partner devoted his full time to the business, drawing $25 per
week and sharing in the profits which were reinvested in the business.
In proceedings by the deceased's dependents under the state Workmen's
Compensation Act, it was held, on questions certified by the Industrial
Accident Commission, that plaintiffs could not recover, since a partner is
niot an employee within the meaning of the act. In re Montgomery & Son,
169 N. E. 879 (Ind. 1930).
The Workmen's Compensation Acts are generally held not to include
partners among those entitled to compensation. Gebera v. Murfreeaboro
Laundry Co., 159 Tenn. 51, 15 S. W. (2d) 737 (1929) ; see HAnP3, Wmex-
MEN'S COMPENSATION (2d ed. 1920) § 106; (1924) 10 VA. L. Rnv. 328.
Although statutes containing definitions of "employee" do not as a rule ex-
pressly or impliedly include partners, several states have passed amend-
ments specifically providing for "working" partners. .WASH. LAWS 1929, e.
132, § 1; Wis. LAws 1929, c. 453, § 3; Mich. Acts 1929, no. 113, p. 261;
Cal. Acts 1917, p. 835; cf. N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw (1922)
h 2 (granting compensation for "working employers") ; see Schouitchi v. Chic
Cloak & Suit Co., 230 N. Y. 296, 298, 130 N. E. 299, 300 (1921). Objec-
tions to such application of the Workmen's Compensation Acts are largely
based on the anomaly of a plaintiff securing an award against himself.
See LeClear -v. Smith, 207 App. Div. 71, 73, 202 N. Y. Supp. 514 (3d Dep't
1923); Berger v. Fidelity Union Casualty Co., 293 S. W. 235 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927). Insistence is, therefore, made on the presence of an employer-
employee relationship. McMillen v. Industrial Commission, 130 Ohio App.
310 (1920) ; Lyle v. Lyle Cider Co., 243 N. Y. 257, 153 N. E. 67 (1926) ;
Gebers v. Murfreesboro Laundry Co., supr Even where the partner's
name appeared on the payroll on which the premiums were based, recovery
has been denied. Wallins Creek Lumber Co. v. Blanton, 228 Ky. 649,
15 S. W. (2d) 465 (1929). However, as opposed to the instant decision,
recovery has been allowed in one jurisdiction even when the partners
were the sole employees. Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Industrial Com-
mission, 86 Okla. 139, 207 Pac. 314 (1922); cf. Knox & Shouse v.
Knox, 120 Okla. 45, 250 Pac. 783 (1926) (recovery allowed where there
were other employees). Similarly, the mere fact that the injured party was
a shareholder or officer in an employing corporation has not prevented re-
covery where ]-e also received wages. In re Raynes, 66 Ind. App. 321, 118
N. E. 387 (1917); Griglioni v. Hope Coal Co., 264 Pac. 1051 (Kan. 1928);
(1917) 27 YALE L. J. 284; cf. Millers' Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hoover, 216
i-. W. 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (statute expressly denying compensation
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to directors and officers interpreted as not excluding "working" directors).
But cf. Boume v. Bourn Co., 221 N. Y. 28, 116 N. E. 364 (1917) (denial
of relief to high executive). The basic purpose of the acts is to relieve and
protect the small wage-earner and provide for his dependents. HAfMlr.,
WORKMN'S COMPENaATION (2d ed. 1920) § 106. That the partners perform
the work themselves which would otherwise be performed by hired em-
ployees should be no cause for denying them as workers the protection in-
tended by the act. See Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Industrial Commission,
supra at 143, 207 Pac. at 317; cf. Columbia Casualty Co. v. Industrial Corn-
mission of Wis., 227 N. W. 292, 293 (Wis. 1929). And where the partner-
ship is insured, any technical objection to the partner being both plaintiff
and defendant would seem to be of less consequence.
